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Abstract: Since independence of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Muslims, as the majority population, have 
established diverse Islamic political parties. The nature of 
such parties has changed from the days of the Old Order 
to the New Order and Reformasi eras. Despite similar 
anatomies between Islamic parties of the Old Order and 
those of Reformasi, Islamic political parties profess different 
ideological missions. While the beginning of Old Order 
saw the confederation of Islamic political parties, Masyumi, 
seeking to promote the establishment of an Islamic State, 
none of the Islamic political parties which mushroomed 
during Reformasi era expressly struggled for the 
establishment of an Islamic state. However, the Islamic 
political parties had to weather similar problems of internal 
conflict and fragmentation. Different ideological strands, 
policy stances and leadership styles are believed to be 
amongst the pivotal root causes of their domestic troubles. 
With their popular votes and parliamentary seats 
significantly reduced, they prove to be no competition to 
the nationalist political parties. 
Keywords: Islamic political parties, reformasi era, conflict. 
Introduction 
Since the era of Dutch colonization, Islam in Indonesia has 
displayed the character of being not only a social movement but also a 
political force to be reckoned with. Series of armed resistence were 
campaigned by Muslims of the archipelago against the colonial 
masters. From the early of the twentieth century onward, the avenue of 
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resistance of Muslims was not only manifested in armed-struggles 
against the colonial forces, but also in form of political parties. Islamic 
parties have distinguished themselves as important political institutions 
which struggle for the interests of Muslims as the majority population 
of Indonesia. However, from the onset of the Old Order until the 
tumultuous period of Reformasi, Islamic politics has been beset with 
chronic instability, with recurring instances of fragmentation and 
conflict coloring the dynamics of intra-Muslim politics. As a result, as 
well as for ideological motive, the fact that Islam is the the religion of 
majority of Indonesian population does make Islamic parties as 
dominant parties in Indonesia. In fact, the trend shows a continuous 
decrease of voters.  
In retrospect, Islam’s role as an organized unit of political 
identification locates an early history to the colonial-era founding of 
Sarekat Islam (SI) by H.O.S. Cokroaminoto in 1912, originally as a 
vehicle to fight for the interests of Muslim traders. A host of Islamic 
parties followed suit since Indonesia gained national independence. On 
7-8 November 1945, Muslims formed a political confederation in the 
form of Majelis Syuro Muslimin (Masyumi), which synergized the 
energies of four main Islamic organizations in Indonesia, viz. 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Perikatan Umat Islam dan 
Persatuan Umat Islam. However, within a period of just two years 
from the first PEMILU, the seeds of fragmentation and intra-Muslim 
wrangling had come out in the open. Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 
(PSII), a Masyumi component, left to form its own party, motivated by 
the desire to gain a ministerial post in Amir Syarifudin’s cabinet.1 Five 
years later, in 1952, NU also broke away from Masyumi and 
established Partai NU. Three factors undergirded NU’s decision to 
organizationally separate itself from Masyumi. First, Masyumi 
politicians who were generally Muslim modernists were said to be 
inclined to look down on traditionalist NU politicians.2 Second, 
Masyumi political elites were set on the Muhammadiyah figure Faqih 
Usman as their choice of the Minister of Religious Affairs, a position 
seen by NU politicians as their cherished domain. Third, Masyumi 
politicians had unilaterally weakened the authority of the NU-led 
                                                                 
1 Lili Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes: Sejarah Perkembangan Partai-Partai Islam di 
Indonesia (Pustaka Pelajar: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2006), pp. 35-36.  
2 Ali Haidar, Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 
1998), p. 105. 
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Dewan Penasihat (Dewan Shuro), by transforming its role from a 
decision-making body to a mere advisory council.3  
Nevertheless, in 1955 general election, results of the inaugural 
general elections (PEMILU: Pemilihan Umum) of 1955 showed that the 
strength of Islamic parties was not to be under-estimated.4 They 
clinched a popular vote tally of 43.71%, not far off from the 46.86% 
achieved together by nationalist parties such as Partai Nasionalis 
Indonesia (PNI), Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI), 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) and 
other pluralist parties.5 While Nahdlatul Ulama was mainly a Java-
based party, Masyumi emerged as the strongest Islamic force in the 
1955 PEMILU, harvesting support from 20.92% of the electorate and 
winning in ten of the overall fifteen electoral districts, including Jakarta 
Raya (26.12 %), South Sumatera (43.13 %), Central Sumatera (50.77%), 
North Sumatera (37%), West Kalimantan (33.25%), South East 
Sulawesi (39.98 %) and Maluku (35.35 %).6 After Soekarno 
promulgated his scheme of Guided Democracy in 1959 and dissolved 
Masyumi in 1960,7 NU, PSII and PERTI coalesced under the Muslim 
League, which by and far backed Soekarno’s ideological tool of 
NASAKOM. NU sources insist that such support was designed to 
specifically countervail PKI’s then burgeoning influence on Soekarno. 
Based on such a strategy, NU created youth, labour, agriculturalist and 
cultural organizations parallel to the existing structure of PKI 8  
At the outset of Suharto’s New Order (1965-1998), Muslim 
politicians hoped for new opportunities to advance the cause of 
Islamic parties in Indonesia. Unfortunately, such lofty hopes were 
dashed as the authoritarian Suharto was not interested in democracy 
and relied heavily on the bureaucracy and military in his approach to 
development. Political stability became the foundation of his 
                                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 37 and p. 105.  
4 Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, pp. 35-36. 
5 Bambang Setyawan, “Pergeseran Kekuatan Partai Nasionalis dan Islam, 1955-2004,” 
Kompas, September 15, 2008. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Based on Kepres No.128 year 1960, the only parties officially recognized by the state 
were PNI, NU, PKI, Partai Katolik, Partai Indonesia (Partindo), PSII, Partai Kristen 
Indonesia (Parkindo), IPKI, Perti and Murba (Setiawan, September 15, 2008). 
8 Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, p. 35, p. 42, and p. 57. 
  
Sri Yunanto and Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
340 
developmental ethos which made up a cardinal part of his ideology of 
progress. The number of political parties was drastically cut down 
following a hardfought 1971 election. In 1973, the New Order regime 
rationalized party politics by patronizing, on the one hand, the fusion 
of the Islamic parties of NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti into a new 
configuration known until today as the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(PPP: United Development Party). Nationalist and Christian-based 
parties: PNI, Partai Katolik, Parkindo, IPKI and Murba, on the other 
hand, merged to form Partai Demokasi Indonesia (PDI: Democratic 
Party of Indonesia). Apart from these two official political groupings, 
the bureaucracy, the army (TNI: Tentera Nasional Indonesia) and a 
handful of nationalist organizations set up the Golongan Karya 
(Golkar), a functional organization which effectively played the role of 
the ruling party despite its official disavowal of its formal status as a 
political party. 
During the early phase of the New Order, Islamic leaders and 
politicians outside PPP expressed interest in mobilizing together as the 
Partai Demokratik Islam Indonesia (PDII: Islamic Democratic Party of 
Indonesia). The attempt to found such an entity was foiled by the New 
Order leadership for fear that it would cause political instability and 
locking of horns with the Muslim modernists. Furthermore, the 
Islamic figures had yet to gain the trust of the state. The New Order 
regime thus urged them to join ranks with Partai Muslimin Indonesia 
(Parmusi: Party of Indonesian Muslims).9  
In 1984, internal bickering erupted between the NU and Muslimin 
Indonesia factions within PPP. Factional tussles arose over leadership 
positions, methods of responding to the government policies, use of 
party symbols, nomination of candidates for the national legislature, 
and allegations of some leaders’ conniving with their counterparts in 
Partai Komunis. The conflict escalated to such an extent that in its 
muktamar (national conference) in 1984 NU resolved to return to its 
Platform of 1926 (Khittah 1926), which restores NU’s position as 
primarily a socio-religious organization that distances itself from 
political affairs which simply implied ending its formal membership in 
PPP. As the backbone of PPP, NU felt politically marginalized and 
groused against what it perceived to be unfair allocation of seats to it in 
Parliament. The departure of NU from PPP reduced electoral support 
                                                                 
9 Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, p. 59; Dhurorudin Mashad, Akar Konflik Politik Islam 
di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Al Kautsar, 2008), p. 263. 
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for PPP in the following two PEMILUs of 1987 and 1992, during 
which it managed to garner only 15.9% and 17% of popular votes 
respectively. In 1997, however, PPP’s popular support rose back to 
21%.10  
The passing of the New Order marked the dawn of a new era of 
Reformasi which since 1998 had opened the floodgates for incessant 
demands for political freedom. The archetypal Indonesian way of 
ordering society via state-orchestrated authoritarian measures had 
suddenly become untenable. Hundreds of political parties including 
Islamic ones were established. 41 of the 141 parties which registered to 
participate in the 1999 PEMILU were purportedly Islamic entities. 17 
of the 48 parties which passed the process of selection and verification 
were Islamic groups. Nonetheless, the figures declined for 2004, when, 
of the 46 parties that successfully went through the Election 
Commission‘s selection and verification exercise, only 7 bore 
specifically Islamic labels. The experience of political party 
fragmentation during the Old Order and the New Order was repeated 
during Reformasi. Despite Islamic parties initially positioning 
themselves as the mainstay of political reform in the new Indonesia, 
internal and conflict greatly eroded their overall strength in the three 
PEMILUs that had taken place since the onset of Reformasi.11 
                                                                 
10 Mashad, Akar Konflik Politik Islam di Indonesia, pp. 59, 84. 
11 The list of Islamic political parties participating in the 1999 PEMILU is marked by 
various appellations which can be categorized into, first, large Islamist parties such as 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP: United Development Party), Partai Bulan 
Bintang (PBB: Crescent and Star Party), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS: Justice and 
Prosperity Party), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN: National Mandate Party) and Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB: National Awakening Party). Second, relatively small and 
arguably unsustainable parties such as Partai Ahlussunah Waljamaah (PAS: Sunni 
Party), Partai Aliansi Kebangkitan Muslim Sunni Indonesia (Alliance of the Awakening 
Indonesian Sunni Party), Partai Abul Yatama (PAY: Abul Yatama Party), Partai 
Amanat Masyarakat Madani (PAMM: Civil Society Mandate Party), Partai Politik 
Tharikat Islam (PPTI: Islamic Tharikat Political Party), Partai Bhakti Muslim (PBM: 
Muslim Dedication Party), Partai Cinta Damai (PCD: The Peace Loving Party), Partai 
Demokrasi Islam Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party), Partai 
Dinamika Umat (People’s Dynamics Party), Partai Dua Syahadat (Two Syahadat 
Party), Partai Era Reformasi Tarbiyah (Educational Reformation Party), Partai 
Indonesia Baru (PIB: New Indonesian Party), Partai Islam Indonesia (PII: Indonesian 
Islamic Party), Partai Islam Persatuan Indonesia (United Indonesian Islamic Party), 
Partai Gerakan Insan Muttaqin Indonesia (Indonesian Movement of Pious People’s 
Party), Partai Ka’bah (Kaaba Party), Partai Kebangkitan Kaum Ahli Sunnah 
(PAKKAM: The Sunni Awakening Party), Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia 
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Projections from various surveys conducted throughout 2012 have 
concluded that most Islamic parties suffer from a poor support base. 
In fact, if a PEMILU were to be called for at the time of the surveys, 
only two Islamic parties would pass the required 3.5% electoral 
threshold as stipulated. Hence, if their existence were to have any 
impact on the Indonesian populace, the best or rather only option left 
for them is to synergistically merge.12 Such a recourse had evidently 
been successfully treaded in the early years following independence, 
when Islamic social organizations joined forces with Masyumi, forming 
an electoral bloc which garnered up to 50% of popular support. After 
many years of subdued existence under the New Order, Islamic parties 
re-asserted their claims as political stakeholders during Reformasi by 
mobilizing the Poros Tengah (lit. Middle Axis), which successfully 
maneuvered the way for Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) to become 
the first democratically elected President of Indonesia. But internal 
conflict and fragmentation were not the only factors contributing to 
the ebbing of Islamic parties’ fortunes. Among other reasons, Muslims’ 
lack of integrity and their parties’ inability to offer distinctive programs 
also accounted for their decline. This article will discuss three 
important issues. First, we look at the pattern of rupture that 
characterized the multi-layered inter-relationships among Islamic 
parties during the period following Reformasi. Second, we broach 
some of the reasons for that rupture. Third, we delve into political 
implications arising from the rupture to the parties themselves and also 
to the Muslim community at large.  
                                                                                                                                      
(Muslim Awakening Party), Partai Kebangkitan Umat (Ummah Awakening Party), 
Partai Kesatuan Umat Indonesia (PKUI: United Indonesian People’s Party), Partai 
Kesatuan Wahdatul Ummah (PKWU: The United People’s Party), Partai Politik Islam 
Masyumi (Masyumi Islamic Party), Partai Majawangi, Partai Masyumi Baru (PMB: New 
Masyumi Party), Partai Nahdlatul Ummah (Nahdlatul Ummah Party), Partai Persatuan 
(Union Party), Partai Persatuan Islam Indonesia (PPII: United Islamic Political Party), 
Partai Persatuan Sabilillah (PPS: United Sabilillah Party), Partai Pengamal Thariqat 
Islam (PPTI: Indonesian Thariqat Practitioners Party), Partai Politik Tharikat 
Indonesia (PPTI: Indonesian Tharikat Political Party), Partai Solidaritas Sunni 
Indonesia (SUNNI: Indonesian Sunni Solidarity Party), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 
(Indonesian Islamic Corporation Party), Partai Umat Islam (PUI: Indonesian Muslim 
Party), Partai Umat Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Party of Muslims), and Partai Islam 
Demokrat (PID: Islamic Democratic Party). 
12 “Jika Ingin Bertahan, Partai Islam Sebaiknya Bergabung,” Kompas, October 22, 2012. 
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In this study, we define ‘Islamic political parties’ as parties which 
possess Islamic attributes and use Islamic symbols in showcasing their 
ideologies and policies, which were established based upon and 
persistently rely on support from Muslims, and whose trajectories set 
them on a clearly different course from those pursued by non-Muslim 
parties. Based on this categorization, we may identify the large Islamic 
parties, which consist of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai 
Bulan Bintang (PBB), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), and Partai 
Bintang Reformasi (PBR). Beside these major political actors, there are 
also a multitude of small Islamic parties (partai gurem).13 In the 
Indonesian context, Islamic parties differ from nationalist parties in 
that unlike the former which categorically struggle for Islamic causes, 
nationalist parties do not relate their struggle to Islam, but rather to the 
interests of Indonesian society, notwithstanding the fact that Muslims 
make up the vast majority of the national population. They also do not 
depend solely on Muslim constituents, but rather to a more plural 
constituency in ethno-religious terms, for their political survival and 
advancement. In many respects, nationalist parties hold to views, 
stances and attitudes which unambiguously differentiate them from 
Islamic parties. 
 
                                                                 
13 Our definition draws from the diverse conceptual understandings put forward by 
Azyumardi Azra (2002), Dhorurotin Mashad (2008) and Lembaga Survei Indonesia 
(2008), which classify Islamist parties according to persuasion, constituency and extent 
of domination of Muslim politicians. Azra divides Islamist parties into three categories: 
parties which avoid using Islam in its program but relies on Muslim constituents, 
parties which are dominated by Muslim politicians and free from the programs and 
influence of non-Islamist parties and non-Muslim constituents, for example Golkar, 
and finally parties that explicitly employ Islam as its main and official agenda; see 
Azyumardi Azra, Reposisi Hubungan Agama dan Negara: Merajut Kerukunan Antarumat 
(Jakarta: Kompas, 2002), pp. 90-110. In Akar Konflik Politik Islam di Indonesia (2008), 
Mashad classifies Islamist parties into “formal” and “substantive” types. Whilst the 
former formally and unequivocally foregrounds Islam in their symbols and policies, the 
latter dispenses with such Islamist certitude but still depends on Muslim constituents 
for the bulk of its support. Substantive Islamist parties, in other words, are inclined to 
adopt a plural and inclusive character. For Lembaga Survei Indonesia (2008), Kekuatan 
Elektoral Partai-Partai Islam menjelang Pemilu 2009 (Jakarta, September 2008), an Islamist 
party is understood as a party which possesses an Islamic-based platform and enjoys a 
sociological and historic relationship with Islam.  
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The Anatomy and Causes of Fragmentation and Conflict among 
Islamic Political Parties  
Debating the causes of fragmentation and conflict in the 
convoluted terrain of Islamic party activism can be daunting if one 
were to be reminded of the fact that no fewer than a hundred political 
parties claiming to project an Islamic identity were suddenly catapulted 
into public space upon the launching of Reformasi. Nonetheless, not 
all protagonists of the many partai gurem were serious in expanding their 
parties’ wings. By and large only politicians from the large Islamic 
parties became staunch torchbearers for Islamic politics in the new 
open political arena. These large Islamic parties not only gained 
indirect support from major Islamic civil society organizations such as 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
dan Gerakan Dakwah Kampus, but they also claim to inherit the 
mantle of the Old Order’s Islamic parties such as Masyumi and Partai 
Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII). In explaining factors leading to the 
fragmentation and conflict among Islamic political parties, this article 
borrows the theoretical framework developed by Nazarudin 
Syamsudin, Zulkifli Hamid and Toto Pribadi. These three scholars are 
of the opinion that the underlying causes of Islamic fragmentation and 
conflict can be found in the ideological differences among party 
members, divergent ways of implementing their respective party 
programs and leadership competition pitting Islamic leaders against 
one another whether in the same or different party.14 As had transpired 
under the Old Order, fragmentation of the Islamic camp during the 
nascent period of Reformasi was greatly conditioned by the different 
ideological orientations of its protagonists. In spite of the fact that 
such differences may have only been at the surface rather than 
substantive level, Islamic leaders in Indonesia still failed to agree on a 
common platform and method of implementing Islamic precepts 
which emphasize the values of brotherhood, camaraderie and 
consensus in their political lives.  
Although the Islamic parties differ in name, leadership and 
management, they share certain common traits such as the symbolic 
use of the cresecent and the five-pointed star, the kalimah syahadah, the 
ka’bah, and the phrases ‘Ahlussunah Waljamaah’, ‘Allah’, and ‘Tasbih’. In 
                                                                 
14 Nazarudin Syamsudin, Zulkifli Hamid and Toto Pribadi, Sistem Politik Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Karunika, Universitas Terbuka, 1988), pp. 5-6. 
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addition, they stick to one common principle i.e. Islam or the Islamic 
religion (dienul Islam), or a combination of maxims and concepts 
invariably associated with Islam such as Akhlakul karimah (good 
deeds), Al-Quran and Hadiths (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad). 
Some Islamic parties encourage the inculcation of Islamic values in 
practical governance, for instance through the formalization of Islamic 
Law (Syariah), increase in the quality of life and enhanced participation 
of the Muslim masses in public affairs. These principles are then 
integrated with the nationalist ethos towards the defence of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Other general objectives include encouraging 
the development of a just and prosperous society, advocating that 
national aims be streamlined with the ambitions of Reformasi, and 
fostering a democratic political system in line with Pancasila. These 
parties bank on support from the diverse Muslim communities to 
achieve their political agendas.15 
The ideological differences amongst leading figures of Islamic 
parties are manifested in the polarization of their support base 
according to doctrinal lines.16 NU elites who embrace traditionalist 
Islam depend on the NU masses. Parties that claim to inherit 
Masyumi’s legacy rely for support on the modernist Muslim 
constituency. Yet characteristics of Islamic parties in Reformasi era 
differ in significant aspects from their predecessors of the 1950s such 
that it might not be appropriate to regard them as the legitimate 
successor of their political forerunners. Islamic parties of the 1950s 
such as Masyumi, among whose ranks include members of both 
Muhammadiyah and NU, had the establishment of Negara Islam 
Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) as its cardinal aim, whereas 
latter-day Islamic parties such as PKB and PAN are open parties which 
do not include Negara Islam Indonesia as part of their agenda. Even 
the more exclusive parties such as PBB, PPP and PKS, while lending 
support to the adoption of Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter), do not 
explicitly proclaim the intention to establish a Negara Islam 
Indonesia.17  
                                                                 
15 Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, p.143; Mashad, Akar Konflik Politik Islam di 
Indonesia, p. 263. 
16 Mashad, Akar Konflik Politik Islam di Indonesia, pp. 140-145.   
17 Fahry Ali (Interview), ‘Politik Santri selalu tersubordinasi oleh Kekuasaan’, Suara 
Muhammadiyah, No.11/TH. Ke-93/, June 1-15, 2008. 
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Out of seventeen Islamic parties which entered the PEMILU fray 
in 1999, nine of them, viz. PSII 1905, PSII, PPP, PMB, PII, PBB, PUI, 
PK and PP, explicitly declared Islam to be their party ideology. 
However, eight others including PUMI, Partai SUNNI, PNU, PCD, 
PKU and PAC chose together Pancasila and Islam as a joint-ideology, 
or expressed preference for some classical Islamic notion or 
terminology such as Ahlussunah Waljamaah as party ideology.18 These 
parties may claim themselves to be Muslim nationalists and enunciate 
Pancasila as their parties’ foundational ideology while at the same time 
taking Islam as their reference point in religious affairs and political 
morality.19 PAN implicitly adopts Islamic values, for example in 
enjoining its members to perform good deeds in their daily lives, as the 
basis for its acculturation program for its rank-and-file members. 
PAN’s emblem, the blue sun, strongly resembles that of 
Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim civil society organization 
with whom most PAN members are affiliated. This is understandable 
in view of PAN’s reliance on grassroots support from Muhammadiyah. 
Associated in the minds of many as the political arm of 
Muhammadiyah, PAN draws its membership from elites in big cities 
and districts where the major universities, the critical middle class and 
Muslim modernists are found in abundance, for example Yogyakarta 
and West Sumatera.20  
Beside the ideological factor, competition among elites and 
differences of opinion around questions of policy implementation also 
contribute to fragmentation and conflict among Islamic political 
parties. Parties which claim to continue the struggles of Syarikat Islam 
Indonesia (PSII) and Masyumi and those which were set up by leaders 
of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and PAN are all embroiled in the wrangling. 
PSII, for instance, split into two groups: PSII 1905 headed by Ohan 
Sudjana and PSII helmed by Anwar Tjokroaminoto, grandson of HOS 
Tjokroaminoto, the founder of SI. Both factional leaders not only 
failed to stem germination of the seeds of conflict which had been 
sowed way back in 1972, but they were also unsuccessful in 
consolidating their pragmatic interests within the larger grouping. 
                                                                 
18 Fahry Ali, ‘Politik Santri selalu tersubordinasi oleh Kekuasaan’. 
19 See for instance AD/ART PAN, article 3.1 
20 Abdul Munir Mulkan, ‘Memahami Perilaku Pemilih Muslim,’ in Hamid Basyaib and 
Hamid Abidin (eds), Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah (Jakarta: Alvabet, 1999), p. 126. 
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Similar factors accounted for fragmentation and conflict among 
Islamic parties which claim to be the intellectual descendants of 
Masyumi. Dismally failing to consolidate their respective 
congregations, leading figures of the Masyumi tradition presided 
instead over the fragmentation of their bloc into: Partai Bulan Bintang 
(PBB), Partai Masyumi Baru (PMB), and Partai Persatuan Islam 
Indonesia21 Within the Nahdliyin or the NU bloc, seven parties also 
emerged out the internal fragmentation and conflict: Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Nahdlatul Ummah (PNU), Partai 
SUNI, Partai Kebangkitan Ummah (PKU), Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Persatuan (PP) dan Partai Bintang 
Reformasi .22 
Inter-factional fragmentation was aggravated by wrangling within a 
particular party, for example internal conflict within PKB and within 
PPP. The first conflict between the Nahdliyin pitted PKB against PPP. 
This clash was a hangover from the New Order conflict which led to 
NU’s severing relations with PPP. Upon the formation of PKB by NU 
elites, many NU politicians in PPP including Matori Abdul Djalil and 
Khofifah Indar Parawangsa promptly transferred their allegiance to 
PKB. PPP saw this exodus as political treachery. PKB elites, on their 
part, accused NU politicians who chose to remain with PPP as NU 
renegades. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), founder and then head of 
PKB’s syuro council went to the extent of berating PPP as lacking 
adequate Islamic knowledge and being pro-status quo. This conflict 
even led to physical confrontation between sympathizers and 
supporters of both sides in several districts such as Pekalongan, Jepara 
and Yogyakarta.23  
Conflict arising from elite competition and policy differences 
extended in time to conflicts between PKB and PNU, between PKB 
and PKU, between PKB and SUNNI and internal conflict within 
PKB. Conflict between PKB and PNU was the consequence of PKB 
progenitor Gus Dur’s wish that NU established a more open party 
which installed the principles of Pancasila and Nasionalism as the party 
ideology. On the other side of the coin, Syukron Makmun, one of the 
leading figures of the NU faction propped up by the Ittihadul 
                                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 191. 
22 Mashad, Akar Konflik Politik Islam di Indonesia, pp. 143-144. 
23 Ibid., pp. 198-201.  
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Mubalighin group, who later emerged as leader of Partai Nahdlatul 
Ummah (PNU), insisted on a party which showed unflinching loyalty 
to Islam of the Ahlussunah Wal Jamaah variety, as couched in its four 
recognized legal schools, viz Hanafi, Maliki, Syafii, and Hanbali.24  
Conflict between PKB and Partai Kebangkitan Ummah (PKU), a 
former constituent of PKB, was an outgrowth of PKB’s adamance in 
promulgating Pancasila as the party ideology. Dominated by Gus Dur’s 
faction, PKB officially rejected the formalization of Islamic law as a 
cornerstone of the Indonesian state. They argued that despite its 
constitutional niceties, such a formal arrangement would not be able to 
deliver justice. The opposing faction then formed the splinter group of 
PKU headed by Yusuf Hasyim and Sholahuddin Wahid. PKU 
demanded the use of constitutional mechanisms to encourage the 
adoption of Islamic law as the basis of Indonesia’s legal and political 
system. They assert that the inculcation of Islamic rules and regulations 
for Muslims was valid and in line with NU’s mission. Conflict also 
arose between factions led by Gus Dur and Abu Hasan, who steered 
his followers to form the breakaway group of SUNI. The immediate 
reason behind the quarrel appeared to be related to inter-elite 
competition during the election for NU’s executive leadership at its 
1994 Congress in Cipayung in which Abu Hasan was defeated by Gus 
Dur in a race for the position of Head of NU’s Executive Council.25 
Differences of views pertaining to internal policy implementation 
also flared up into rupture within the large PKB family. The first 
conflict pitted Gus Dur, Head of the Dewan Syuro (Advisory Council) 
against Matori Abdul Djalil, head of the Dewan Tanfidziah (Executive 
Council). Gus Dur had prohibited Matori from attending parliament-
tary sessions on the basis that it went against party policy. Matori 
retaliated by brusquely opposing the presidential decree issued by Gus 
Dur, who then maneuvered the abrupt replacement of Matori as head 
of Dewan Tanfidziah with Alwi Shihab. The internal fighting polarized 
PKB into two opposing factions: PKB Batutulis led by Matori and 
PKB Kuningan helmed by Gus Dur and Alwi Shihab.  
The second internal conflict transpired when the Gus Dur-
Muhaimin Iskandar and Alwi Shihab-Syaifullah Yusuf factions locked 
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horns with each other. Alwi Shihab was then Coordinating Minister for 
People’s Well-being (Menteri Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat) while 
Syaifullah Yusuf held the post of State Minister of Underdeveloped 
Districts (Menteri Negara Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal) in the 
cabinet of President Sushilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY).26 Gus Dur’s 
decision, taken in his capacity of Head of the Dewan Syuro, to sack 
Alwi Shihab and Syaifullah Yusuf outside of the official party 
mechanism triggered the quarrel. Gus Dur accused the two politicians 
of neglecting their responsibilities as the party’s Chief Executive and 
Secretary General respectively. As a consequence, PKB split into 
opposing Gus Dur-Muhaimin and Alwi Shihab-Syaifullah Yusuf 
factions. Thereafter Alwi Shihab and Syaifullah Yusuf appointed 
Abdurrahman Chudlori, an NU cleric from Magelang Central Java to 
the position of Head of the Dewan Syuro and promoted Chairul Anam 
as Head of the Executive Council. 27 
The Alwi-Syaifullah faction received support from eleven Kyai 
Langitan (spiritual leaders) who rejected the Congress for allegedly 
flouting party regulations. Contrary to expectations, 29 regional 
representatives nominated Gus Dur yet again for the post of Head of 
Dewan Syuro. The Alwi-Syaifullah faction heaped blame on party elites 
for deposing them, as they claimed to have acquired the rightful 
mandate of leadership within the party as a result of having been 
lawfully elected during the Extraordinary Congress in Yogyakarta on 
17-19 January 2002.28 The conflict eventually ended with the 
withdrawal of Alwi and Syaifullah from PKB. Alwi Shihab then sought 
to establish the Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Ulama (PKNU), while 
Syaifullah Yusuf moved to PPP.29  
The third conflict saw a rift develop between ertswile allies, namely 
Gus Dur and Muhaimin Iskandar, also a former Head of the Executive 
Council. Gus Dur fired Muhaimin Iskandar without going through 
                                                                 
26 “PKB, Berpartai di Tengah Konflik”, http://www.hupelita.com/baca.php?id=55-
400, accessed on July 10, 2010. 
27 Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB (Jakarta: Akses Publishing, 2008), pp. 2-3. 
28 H. Anton Djawamaku, “Perpecahan Partai Politik, Pemberantasan Korupsi dan 
Berbagai Masalah Politik Lainnya,” Analisis CSIS, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 123-
125. 
29 Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, pp. 2-3, and p. 44. 
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proper party channels, supplanting him with Ali Masykur Musa.30 
According to Gus Dur’s version of events, Muhaimin had attempted 
to oust Gus Dur from the leadership of the Dewan Syuro and install 
instead Hasyim Muzadi, NU chief executive, in his place. Gus Dur also 
accused Muhaimin of cooperating with President SBY. As evidence of 
his allegations, Gus Dur referred to SBY’s decision to appoint 
Muhaimin’s nominee, Lukman Edy, as Minister of Underdeveloped 
Districts, thus repudiating Gus Dur’s proposed candidate Sigit Haryo 
Wibisono.31 Protesting against Muhaimin’s dismissal, members of his 
faction brought the matter to the courts which pronounced that the 
sacking was invalid. Based on the judicial verdict, Muhaimin and 
Lukman Edy continued to lead PKB in their official capacities.32  
Table 1: Chronology of Internal Conflict within PKB33 
Phase Conflicting Parties Period Case Consequences 
1 Matori Abdul Djalil 
(PKB Batutulis) vs 
Gus Dur Alwi 
Shihab (PKB 
Kuningan) 
2001-2002 Head of Dewan 
Syuro Gus Dur 
sacks Head of Party 
Executive Matori 
Abdul Djalil  











Syuro dismisses Alwi 
Shihab as Head of 
Party Executive and 
Syaifullah Yusuf as 
Secretary-General, 
arising from their 
appointments as 
Alwi Shihab and 
Syaifullah Yusuf 
resigns from PKB. 
Alwi Shihab 
establishes PKNU 
and Syaifullah joins 
PPP 
                                                                 
30 Dwi Riyanto Agustiar, “PKB Kubu Muhaimin Segera Bawa Hasil Muktamar ke 
Departemen Hukum”, May 4, 2008, www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2008/-
05/04/brk,20080504-122433.id.html, accessed on July 10, 2010. 
31 Asrori S. Karni, “Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa: Manuver Gus Dur Menggoyang 
Muhaimin”, Gatra, no. 36, July 25, 2007, http://www.gatra.com/2007-07-25/artikel.-
php?id=106372, accessed on March 4, 2009. 
32 “Departemen Hukum Sahkan Kubu Muhaimin”, Tempo, June 25, 2008, http://hu-
kumham.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1073&Itemid, access-
ed on March 4, 2009. 
33 Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB.  
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Phase Conflicting Parties Period Case Consequences 
members of SBY’s 
cabinet 
3 Muhaimin Iskandar-
Lukman Edy vs Gus 
Dur Ali Masykur 
Musa-Yenny Wahid 
2008 Dewan Syuro ousts
Muhaimin Iskandar 
as Head of Party 
Executive. Gus Dur 
accuses Muhaimin 
of attempting to 
depose him from his 
position as Head of 
Dewan Syuro  
Muhaimin brings 
this case to the 
judiciary and won. 
He therefore 
continues in his 
position as Head of 
Party Executive. 
Divergence of views on policy implementation can be explained at 
both individual and institutional levels. At the individual level, Gus 
Dur’s uniquely unrelenting disposition was the overriding factor. At 
the institutional level, the management of PKB, as a new political 
organization, was found lacking in modern political culture.34. PKB 
failed to circumscribe Gus Dur’s personal influence which often 
transgressed internal party rules. Difficulties persistently cropped up 
because Gus Dur had from its outset wielded a dominant say over 
PKB’s domestic affairs. Although the conflict was eventually settled 
through judicial proceedings, it most probably contributed significantly 
to the decline in popular support for PKB in the three PEMILUs of 
Reformasi era. 
In 2004, a bitter leadership struggle drove a wedge within the 
upper echelons of PPP’s internal structure. This occurred when a well-
known preacher, Zainuddin MZ, along with his compatriots among 
PPP leaders left PPP to form Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR). 
Regarding PBR’s ideological orientation as no different from the true 
precepts of PPP, Zainuddin expressed disappointment at PPP and 
other Islamic parties for failing to fulfill his hopes.35 Conflict within 
PPP was further externalized when the MI-Parmusi factions and 
several NU politicians who remained in PPP were at loggerheads over 
the distribution of seats in Parliament. NU politicians in PPP thought 
that they had received a less than fair deal since having their allocation 
                                                                 
34 Bahtiar Effendi, ‘Gus Dur tidak salah’, http://www.inilah.com/, November 23. 
2009, accessed on March 4, 2009. 
35 Irsyad Zamjani, Sekularisasi Setengah Hati (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 2009), p. 223. 
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cut down during the PEMILU of 1977.36 In another drama, Head of 
PPP Suryadarma Ali removed Irgan Chairul Mahfuds from the party’s 
Department of Secretary-General. Ali also refused to support 
candidates from among PPP home-grown cadres for district elections 
in East Java XI and West Java XI. The recurring conflicts revolving 
around the question of candidacies for parliament demonstrated the 
unduly dominant influence that traditional leaders possessed over party 
procedures. In addition, some of them unabashedly brought along with 
them a slew of oligarchic and corrupt practices which flouted 
fundamental political ethics.37  
Internal wrangling also affected Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) 
after the PEMILU of 2004. Frustrated PAN members, who were 
overwhelmingly also members of Muhammadiyah as the main 
constituent group of PAN, founded the Partai Matahari Bangsa 
(PMB). They argued that PAN had failed to further the interests of 
Muhammadiyah despite the fact that a large majority of PAN leaders 
had originated from Muhammadiyah. The rupture led to the scattering 
of politically-inclined Muhammadiyah members into several different 
political parties.38 However, internal conflict within PAN had no 
significant impact on popular support for PAN. Its popular vote tally 
of 6.01% during the PEMILU of 2009 was only a slight decrease from 
what it had registered in 2004. The PMB experimentation may be 
deemed to have failed if assessed from the dismal 0.4% of popular 
votes that it commanded, thus failing to even reach the electoral 
threshold. Meanwhile, other more sustainable Islamic parties were also 
unsuccessful in garnering higher support from the masses. Smaller 
Islamist parties such as PBB found it difficult to defend its measure of 
popular support mustered in 2004. The anatomy of fragmentation and 
conflict of Islamic political parties can be gleaned from the figure 1.  
 
 
                                                                 
36 Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, pp. 72-74. 
37 R Ferdian Andi, ‘Kisruh di PPP? Sudah Tradisi!’, http://www.inilah.com/beri-
ta/pemilu-2009/2008/, accessed on March 4, 2009. 
38 Idris Hemay, ‘Pertarungan Parpol Islam 2009’, http://www.csrc.or.id/artikel , acces-
sed on March 4, 2009. 
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Figure 1: The Anatomy of Fragmentation and Conflict of Islamic 
Political Parties in the Post-Reformasi Era 
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Implications 
The fragmentation and conflict that beleaguered Islamic parties 
had contributed to the dispersal of Muslim votes and shrinking of the 
voice of Islamic parties. Muslim constituencies were inclined to 
distance themselves from the Islamic parties when these parties failed 
in both distinguishing themselves from secular parties and solving their 
internal crises, whether inter-party or intra-party.39 Muslim failure to 
vote as a unified bloc rendered unsuccessful every attempt by Islamic 
parties to become the majority voice in Parliament. Fragmentation at 
the upper echelons of party leadership filters down to the grassroots 
level as defeated leadership candidates resort to founding new parties, 
hence further complicating the already muddled scenario. Ambitious 
but quixotic, such aspirants to political power effectively stifled hopes 
for better synergy and coordination among Islamic parties. To the 
general public, a prevailing negative impression of Islamic parties has 
become the norm.40  
Table 2 shows the proportion of popular votes gained and 
parliamentary seats won by Islamic parties during the three PEMILUs 
in Reformasi era. After ten years of Reformasi (1999-2009), the figures 
for Islamic parties show a marked drop, except in the case of PKS. 
Table 2: Percentages of Popular Votes and Parliamentary Seats 
Mustered by Islamic Parties during the Three Post-Reformasi 






















PPP 10.7% 58 8.15% 58 -2.55% 5.3% 37 -2.85% 
PKB 12.6% 52 10.57% 52 -2.03 4.94% 27 -5.63% 
PAN 7.12% 33 6.44% 53 -0.68% 6.01% 45 -0.43% 
PBB 1.94% 13 2.62% 11 +0.68% 1.78% n/a -0.84% 
PK(S) 1.36% 7 7.4% 45 +6.04% 7.88% 57 +0.48% 
PNU 0.64% 5 n/a n/a  n/a  n/a n/a  
PKNU n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a 1.47% n/a  
                                                                 
39 Muhammad Azhar, Posmodernisme Muhammadiyah, (Yogyakarta, Suara Muhamma-
diyah, 2005), p. 96.  
40 S. Kirbiantoro and Dody Rudianto, Pergulatan ideologi Partai Politik di Ideologi Partai 
Politik di Indonesia: Nasionalisme, Islamisme, Komunisme, Militerisme (Jakarta: Inti Media 
Publisher, 2005), pp. 52-54. 
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PBR n/a n/a 2.44% 13 n/a 1.21% n/a -1.23% 
PPNUI n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.14% a/a  
PMB n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.4% n/a  
PSI n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.14% n/a  
In the three PEMILUs of 1999, 2004 and 2009, Islamic parties 
never formed the majority bloc in Parliament. As compared with the 
corresponding figures for nationalist parties, those of Islamic parties 
showed a clearly declining trend. Figure 2 and 3 depict Islamic parties 
as consistently managing to gain less than 40% and 43% of popular 
votes and parliamentary seats respectively. These statistics serve to 
prove that more than 50% of Muslim voters constantly support 
nationalist parties in successive PEMILUs, notwithstanding the fact 
that Muslims make up about 90% of Indonesia’s population and 
electorate. 
Figure 2: Comparison of Popular Votes for Islamic Parties with Popular 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Parliamentary Seats of Islamic Parties with 
Parliamentary Seats of Nationalist Parties in the Post-Reformasi Era 
(1999, 2004, 2009) 
 
 
Admittedly, it can be argued that the failure to solve internal 
conflict was not the sole factor causing stagnation and later decline of 
support for the Islamic parties throughout the Reformasi period. 
Other explanations include, first, the majority of Indonesians do not 
see many differences between the conduct of members of Islamic 
parties and the behavior of members of nationalist parties, including in 
the breach of Islamic moral codes. Those identified in the public 
minds as Islamic politicians are not immune to being implicated in 
numerous corruption allegations and sex scandals. Their demeanor has 
been arguably far removed from what the public expects of them as 
torchbearers of Islam. Their political antics and liberal use of Islamic 
emblems are thus widely interpreted as being tailored toward selfish 
political interests.41 The following table 3 enumerates Islamic 
politicians who have been implicated in graft-related scandals. 
                                                                 
41 “Perlu Teologi Politik Baru”, Suara Muhammadiyah, No 10/TH. Ke 94, May 16-31, 
2009. 
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Table 3: List of Islamic Politicians Alleged to have been Involved in 
Corruption42 




member of the 
commission 
VIII 
Alleged to have received 1.52 billion 
rupiah from Badan Pengawas Tenaga 
Nuklir (BAPETEN: Nuclear 
Monitoring Body) for agreeing to 
BAPETEN’s proposal for extra funds 
originating from APBN 2004. 
Yusuf Emir 
Faisal 
PKB Alleged to have received 8 billions 
rupiah in the case of the alienation of a 
600-hectare forest reserve in south 
Sumatera. Money from the land sale 
was later transferred partly to PKB. 
Al Amin 
Nasution 
PPP Alleged to have received 291 million 
rupiah from the alienation of a forest 
reserve in Bintan Bunyu, Riau, for the 
purpose of urban expansion schemes in 
Bintan region. 
Bulyan Royan Partai Bintang 
Reformasi 
(PBR) 
Alleged to have received commission 
payments amounting to 8% (1.43 billion 
rupiah) from Binan Mina Karya 
Perkasa, a supplier for the Ministry of 
Communications. Acting in cahoots 
with other party members, he was said 
to have ensured that the company 
secure the tender of purchasing 20 
vessels of the value of IDR 118 billion. 
In receiving the commission, he was 
purportedly acting on behalf of a 
parliamentary committee. 
                                                                 
42 Republika, February 29, 2008; Tempo, March 2008; April 2008; July 2008; July 2008; 
August 2008. 
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Politician Political Party Remarks
Yusril Ihza 
Mahendra 




Alleged to have received pecuniary 
rewards from PT Sarana Rekatama 
Dinamika, a company which he pin-
pointed, without going through the 
tender process, to operate an 
administrative online system at the 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights. 
The online system was designed to 
facilitate the registration of private firms 
with the Ministry. PT Sarana Rekatama 
Dinamika was thought to have allotted 
10% of the project’s total worth for 
underhand distribution to employees 






Alleged to have given monetary 
incentives to the value of 6.1 billion 
rupiah to the legal bureau of Urip Tri 
Gunawan, which handled the 
corruption case of Syamsul Nursalim, 
proprietor of Bank Dagang Indonesia 




PAN politician Alleged to have received a bribe of IDR 
6 billion for his role in allocating 
infrasuctural funds to the regions of 
Aceh Besa, Pidie Jaya and Bener Meriah 






Together with his close friend Ahmad 
Fathanah, he was alleged to have 
received a IDR1 billion downpayment 
of a bribe totalling IDR40 billion, which 
PT Indoguna promised to them for 
mediating on behalf of the company in 
its bid for the licence to import beef. 
Second, Islamic parties lack a clear and consistent direction in their 
furtherance of party ideology. Islamic parties are widely seen by the 
Muslim masses as exploiting Islamic symbols for political gain. 
Unfortunately, such manipulative commodification of religion no 
longer attracts a large number of Muslim constituents, who prefer 
instead kesejahteraan (welfare) programs offered by civil society 
organizations.  
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Third, leaders of Islamic parties have by and large conflated 
between theological and sociological interpretations of political 
variables. Theologically, they adopt a utopian vision of Islam as a 
perfect religion with infallible precepts in the political ordering of 
society. Yet, they are wont to deny the reality that a sustainable hold on 
power requires broad-based public support. Hence, they sociologically 
misinterpret that the Muslim society will, in their position as the 
majority population, necessarily mobilize its members in support of 
Islamic-based parties. A lot of Islamic politicians take for granted the 
exigency to make an effort to “convert” their potential Muslim 
clientele to their policies and causes. Trapped in a normative discourse, 
Islamic parties become less than sensitive toward the needs of Muslim 
contituents who demand realistic, contextual and down-to-earth 
policies with regard to their quotidian interests. These parties have 
mostly failed to modernize their structures and culture in line with the 
opening of political space, with liberalizing trends, professional 
management methods and strategic communications in mundane 
affairs swiftly following in tandem.43  
Fourth, many constituents of modernist Muslims blamed the poor 
performance of Islamic parties and the break down of the Middle Axis 
on Gus Dur. Islamic parties suffered loss of credibility during Gus 
Dur’s presidency for two reasons. The first is his Israel-friendly foreign 
policy. Liberal and tolerant as Indonesian Muslims seem to be, the 
Zionist state’s position as the nemesis of Muslims has been powerfully 
in their minds for generations.44 The second is that the Islamic parties, 
especially those of Masyumi and Muhammadiyah-based parties, also 
lacked the will to stem the tide of Gus Dur’s controversial political 
maneuvers and poor political as well as administrative performance. In 
turn, his administration failed to eradicate corruption and hamper 
economic recovery which is the main raison d’etre of Reformasi. From 
the Islamic political perspective, it destroys political consensus that 
hitherto existed especially among supportive Islamic political forces. 45  
                                                                 
43 Ahmad Norma Pemata, “Kegagalan Partai Islam”, Suara Muhammadiyah; Shohifah, 
Suara Muhammadiyah, http://suara muhammadiyah.com/2010/?p=593, accessed 
March 4, 2009. 
44 Mashad, Akar Konflik Politik Islam di Indonesia, p. 275. 
45 Azra, Reposisi Hubungan Agama dan Negara, pp. 60-67. 
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The Fragmentation of Islamic Political Parties in the Presi-
dential Election 
In the early years of Reformasi, Islamic political parties had 
established themselves as a political force to be reckoned with. In 
1999, when the President was chosen in Parliament, Islamic parties, 
mobilized chiefly by Amien Rais of PAN, formed the Poros Tengah 
(Middle Axis). This coalition created majority in the parliament but it 
was fragile because it was based on short-terms pragmatic causes. 
Bolstered by the Golkar party, which was the second largest party after 
1999 election, Poros Tengah successfully carried through Gus Dur’s 
candidature for presidency, beating his rival Megawati Soekarno Putri 
from the nationalist PDI Perjuangan (PDI-P), despite PDI-P garnering 
the largest number of popular votes in the 1999 PEMILU. Poros Tengah 
had then played the intermediate role of moderating between the pro-
Golkar Poros Habibie perceived as carrying the New Order legacy, and 
Poros Megawati propped up by nationalists mainly from PDI-P. 
Following the majority of parliamentarians’ rejection of President 
Habibie’s responsibility speech (pidato pertanggungjawaban) and and the 
lingering image of Golkar as the political tool of Suharto’s 
authoritarian New Order Regime, Akbar Tanjung as Golkar’s General 
Head (Ketua Umum) hesitated on renominating Habibie for the 
presidency and aligned instead with Poros Tengah. Apparently this 
alliance came with heavy price which put heavy burden on 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s administration. Akbar Tanjung’s capricious 
political attitude led to factionalization within Golkar between pro-
Habibie and pro-Akbar Tanjung elements. 
Nevertheless, within the period of two years, symptoms of conflict 
began to show among leading figures of Poros Tengah, pitting especially 
Gus Dur against Amien Rais, Akbar Tanjung and others. The political 
infighting brought about the downfall of Gus Dur from the presidency 
in 2001, after which Megawati automatically ascended to the reins of 
the power structure as Vice President (Wakil Presiden) whose mainstay 
of support was Poros Tengah. Ironically, Megawati was previously 
identified as the leading figure of the nationalist axis which was 
antagonistic toward Poros Tengah. With the utter disappointment of 
protagonists of Poros Tengah with Gus Dur, excuses to oust him from 
presidency were easily fabricated. Gus Dur was alleged to have 
involved in corruption scandal from National Logistic Bureau (Bulog) 
infamously known as “Bulog-gate”, in the imbroglio of the Sultan of 
  
Conflict among Islamist Political Parties in Indonesia 
361 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
Brunei’s financial aid known as “Brunei-gate”, and in his personal 
lobbying for the disgraced Tommy Suharto, son of former President 
Soeharto found guilty of corruption. 
In the presidential election of 2004, the strength of Islamic parties 
was fragmented into five camps, each backing a different presidential 
candidate with different backgrounds combining nationalist and 
Islamic persuasions. Islamic parties nominated candidates for both 
President and Vice President in pairs with nationalist candidates. For 
example, presidential candidate Megawati Sukarno Putri, as a 
nationalist figure and General Head of PDI-P paired with vice 
president candidate Hasyim Muzadi, the distinguished head of 
Nahdlatul Ulama. Presidential candidate Amien Rais, as leader of the 
Islamic party PAN and former General Head of Muhammadiyah 
(PAN-Muhammadiyah) paired with Siswono Yudhohusodo, a former 
GMNI (Nationalist Student Movement) head and Golkar figure well 
known for his nationalist leaning. Presidential aspirant Hamzah Haz, 
incumbent vice President and Head of the Islamic PPP paired with a 
retired TNI Lieutenant General Agum Gumelar of the nationalist 
faction. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the nationalist presidential 
candidate who had pioneered the splinter Partai Demokrat, chose 
Jusuf Kalla, a Golkar figure with a background of activist experience in 
HMI and NU, as his vice President running mate. The SBY-Jusuf 
Kalla pair eventually won the first-ever direct elections for President 
and Presidential Representative for the term 2004-2009. 
The formation of such ideologically hybrid coalitions involving 
both nationalist and Muslim politicians and the decline in support for 
Islamic political parties point toward a certain amount of “de-
ideologization”, “desacralization” and perhaps even secularization on 
their part.46 By “de-ideologization” and “desacralization”, we mean a 
process where Islamic politicians no longer rely on Islam as a ‘sacred’ 
doctrine on whose basis political decisions and political moves are 
made and considered. Pragmatic and rational considerations appear to 
have gained upper hand in their shceme of things. “De-ideologization” 
often goes hand in hand with secularization, although not necessarily. 
Throughout Reformasi, it is plausible to argue that Islamic parties 
underwent secularization to certain degree.47 By “secularization” as a 
                                                                 
46 Mashad, Akar Konflik Politik Islam di Indonesia, p. 282. 
47 Ibid., pp. 143-4. 
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generic term, we mean the use of secular or rational criteria, replacing 
religious and metaphysical doctrines and emblems in the process of 
decision-making, in both thought and action.48 In the Indonesian 
political context, secularization denotes a process in which religious 
symbols or doctrines no longer command a magnetic effect for Islamic 
parties in attracting the Muslim electorate, for whom religious factors 
are not accorded priority in making political decisions.  
Prior to the presidential election of 2009, some Muslim 
personalities toyed with the idea of formulating a breakaway Poros 
Tengah II. Din Syamsudin, the Muhammadiyah head, was among its 
advocates. Yet, actualization of the idea stalled on account of the many 
criticisms received and the doubts raised as to its viability. Sceptics 
disputed the feasibility of coalition politics and raised manifold 
problems concerning lack of support and finance. The PEMILU of 
2009 demonstrated paradoxes governing relationships between Islamic 
parties and Islamic civil society organizations. Whereas Islamic political 
parties backed the SBY-Budiono partnership, Muhammadiyah and NU 
implicitly threw their support behind the Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto duo. As 
the results turned out, the SBY-Budiono won, while the Megawati-
Prabowo combination emerged second, leaving the Jusuf Kalla-
Wiranto team in third place. This pathetic outcome should have driven 
the message to leaders of the Islamic parties that they were far 
removed from the grassroots aspirations of their purported Muslim 
constituents. They need to urgently assess their priorities and return to 
their socio-cultural foundations while at the same time strengthening 
human resource development among rank-and-file members using 
modern management techniques.49  
Conclusion 
There is striking resemblance between the anatonomy of 
fragmentation and conflict of Islamic political parties during the era of 
Reformasi with that during the Old Order. From the age of the Old 
Order until the days of Reformasi, Muslim leaders have continually 
failed in their quest of uniting the Muslim voice till it became a solid 
political bloc. Their early enthusiasm during the Old Order, as 
                                                                 
48 Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, “Religion, secularism and the state in Southeast Asia,” 
in Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney (eds), Thinking International Relations Differently 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 253-256. 
49 Ali Masykur Musa, “(Bukan) Kegamangan Politik Islam,” Republika, August 3, 2009. 
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expressed in the establishment of Masyumi, which in certain aspects 
parallels the Reformasi-era development pertaining to the formation of 
pragmatic Poros Tengah, evaporated once it became evident that political 
wheeling and dealing took the better of them than the Islamic call for 
unity. Fragmentation and conflict of Islamic political parties were the 
order of the day, and in today Reformasi period, these splits and 
tussles were palpably demonstrated to the Indonesian nation during 
successive legislative and presidential elections. 
Conflicts that arose among Islamic parties ranged from issues such 
as ideological differences, policy variations and elite competition. In 
the case of PKB, the pivotal factor was concentration of power in the 
hands of one leader i.e. Gus Dur, who acquired the habit of flouting 
his party’s own rules. Dispersal of the political strength of Islamics 
during the presidential elections was also motivated by the widely 
spread desire of gaining short term spoils of power, for example in the 
distribution of cabinet positions. 
The fragmentation and conflict discussed in this article had 
undesirably relegated the importance of the Islamic voice vis-à-vis that 
of the nationalist bloc. Ideology is no longer rule of the game. In their 
soul-searching and self-introspection following the negative 
ramifications from their falling out with one another, Muslim 
politicians need to mirror their own actions and attitudes against 
Islam’s own moral code. With so-called Muslim politicians themselves 
being implicated in a host of sex and graft scandals, not to mention the 
infighting among them, one cannot blame lay people on the street’s 
perception of Muslim politicians as being no different from their 
secular counterparts. With no obvious difference between both 
cohorts of leaders on the personal morality scale, a voter is bound to 
choose leaders who can give them a better deal on bread and butter 
issues, rather than elect politicians who are good at pontificating but 
falter in the delivery of tangible goods and needs. [] 
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